Russo-Ukrainian war and the rest of the world
The war is changing the world in non-obvious ways
The war started in 2014, burned hot, simmered for eight years, and flared up again two months ago. Against the expectations of Putin & Co. and of most outside observers, it didn’t end in three days.
The “special military operation” turned into a war of attrition that will drag on for a long time… unless something unexpected happens. Here is my attempt to comprehend the war’s effects on the world outside of the conflict zone – Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. Let’s look at the global issues, the Russian camp, the Ukrainian one, and the countries on the fence.
Global issues
The war pushed one existential threat – climate change – into the background and elevated another menace – the threat of nuclear war. And COVID-19 is not the scariest thing anymore.
Climate change is getting less attention these days. In the short run, we may end up with more fossil fuel extraction capacity as countries drill to compensate for Russian oil and gas. In the long run, high energy prices and clarity about the risks of dependency on unfriendly regimes will probably accelerate fossil fuel replacement by renewables and nuclear.
The threat of nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones, is not unthinkable once again. We were also reminded that nuclear deterrence depends on having not just nukes but also values and balls – see the opinion piece by James Lewis Putin's M.A.D. Gamble:
With the invasion of Ukraine, Putin is calling our bluff on MAD. While the US suggests it is willing to respond to threats with nuclear force, Putin knows that Western democratic governments are extremely averse to doing so. That aversion means that dictators can violate borders and destroy democracies with confidence that the US and NATO will not put troops in any non-NATO country that the Russian military already has a presence in. The US’s position of “strategic ambiguity,” keeping our commitments vague to prevent provocation, is collapsing under the Russian strategy to “escalate to de-escalate.” By making threats of nuclear war, Russia is forcing the US to abandon ambiguity and reveal precisely what it is—and is not—willing to commit to Ukraine. This reveal of American commitments could have global implications.
Russian camp
In this war, Russia has no influential real allies. I saw no media reports of any material assistance to Russia. A few hundred Syrian mercenaries hardly matter. Words of support from China might, more on this later.
Just four countries voted with Russia against UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/2 demanding that Russia withdraw from Ukraine's recognized sovereign territory: Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria. What a company!
Ukrainian camp
The reaction of liberal democracies was surprisingly swift and forceful. Over time, it became clear that it varies widely from country to country. Here is what I find noteworthy:
In absolute terms, Ukraine’s staunchest supporters have been so far the US, UK, and… Estonia! Poland pledged little military aid and instead concentrated on financial aid commitments of around $900 million, making it the second-largest overall donor to Ukraine after the US.
But if measured by donor GDP, Estonia and Poland are doing the most. Well, they know what’s at stake.
This is a rare bipartisan issue in the US. For example, see this POLITICO article – In the fight against Putin, Senate unanimously approves measure that once helped beat Hitler. This is a big deal. For a brief moment, it even felt like the culture wars subsided a bit in the shadow of a real one.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has traveled to Kyiv. US Secretaries of State and Defense were there yesterday. The UK is reopening its embassy in Kyiv… Britain is even reconsidering its Butler to the World role, “a favoured destination for funnelling the finances of oligarchs and the globe's super rich.”
Interesting empirical observation: Over the last 200+ years, Russia (in all its incarnations) won most (all?) wars when it was allied with Britain and lost its fights when it wasn’t. Think Napoleonic and Balkan wars, Crimean war, Russo-Japanese war, wars with Poland and Finland, World War II, Afghanistan…
Germany supported economic sanctions and swiftly doubled its defense budget. Now it’s slowly moving away from its traditional (since Willy Brandt's days) Ostpolitik. In The Economist’s opinion, “Germany has changed its defence and foreign policies, but not its mentality.” Moreover…
There is also good old Gerhard Schröder, former chancellor of Germany. He is paid almost $1 million a year by Russian-controlled energy companies and holds to his unwavering belief that peace and prosperity in Germany and Europe will always depend on dialogue with Russia:
“You can’t isolate a country like Russia in the long run, neither politically nor economically,” he said. “German industry needs the raw materials that Russia has. It’s not just oil and gas, it’s also rare earths. And these are raw materials that cannot simply be substituted.”
“When this war is over,” Mr. Schröder said, “we will have to go back to dealing with Russia. We always do.”
Underneath all this is Germany’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels, raw materials, and markets. Apparently, low-cost energy is essential for several German industries. This podcast gives a balanced analysis of the importance of Russian gas for Germany.
France’s government was rather reserved so far, probably to avoid rocking the boat before the presidential elections. Fortunately, these are now over.
Turkey is trying to maintain good relations both with Ukraine and Russia. But it is supplying Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 drones, closed the straights to the Russian Navy and its airspace to Russian flights to Syria. Turkey may gain more influence in the region as a result of the war.
Finland and Sweden are joining NATO.
Hungary and Georgia are trying hard not to alienate Russia.
Switzerland announced that it had frozen $6.17 billion worth of Russian assets covered by sanctions, a fraction of the approximately $213 billion worth of Russian wealth in the country.
Japan and Taiwan are being solid US allies. And Taiwan is learning from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
NATO was slow to send Ukraine heavy weapons. But now, Ukraine has proved its viability, and the war is turning into a war of attrition. So NATO is gearing up. In this context, it’s important that former Warsaw Pact and former USSR republics have lots of Soviet- and Russian-designed weaponry that Ukrainians are familiar with (h/t Franz-Stefan Gady):
Meanwhile, the EU is paying Russia ~$1B per day for fossil fuels. It says it’s working hard to reduce this dependency, but it will take months, if not years. This is bad policy, bad economics, and bad optics. It looks like the EU is moving towards either an energy embargo or some punitive tariffs:
If sanctions are off the table, Europe might consider stiff tariffs on Russian energy instead. Taxing imports of oil and gas would not stop them from flowing west entirely. It would, however, crimp demand for Russian hydrocarbons as surely as levies on booze and cigarettes deter drinking and smoking. <…>
The aim of any sanctions regime is to impose crippling costs on the enemy while suffering little inconvenience yourself. Some economists reckon tariffs would even help the eu turn a profit at Russia’s expense.
The next challenge for NATO is the Russian naval blockade that is crippling the Ukrainian economy. Will NATO dare to bust the blockade – have Russia take the risk of stopping or attacking merchant ships under the flags of NATO countries?
Countries on the fence
While only five countries voted against UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/2 demanding that Russia withdraw from Ukraine's recognized sovereign territory, 48 countries abstained or were conveniently absent. Among them were China, India, South Africa, Vietnam… These countries represent the majority of the world population. UN vote was split even more on the resolution that suspended the membership of Russia in the UN Human Rights Council. This is something that we should not lose sight of – the so-called “global south” is ambivalent about this fight.
Naturally, the position of China is most important.
China
Before the war, in early February, Putin went to China and met Xi. Russia and China issued a declaration of a "no limits" partnership, backing each other over standoffs on Ukraine and Taiwan with a promise to collaborate more against the West. A couple of weeks after starting the invasion, Russia has requested military and economic assistance from China. Apparently, it didn’t get it. Here is the digest of what I learned from reading up on SupChina analysis of the Chinese position:
China was unpleasantly surprised by the invasion. The failure to win quickly and cleanly was even more frustrating. And China was quite annoyed by the NATO unity. China is concerned that the war is causing economic and geopolitical instability.
Xi’s position: China's interests are served by a draw – strong but dependent Russia, independent and neutral Ukraine. China is sticking to the narrative of the Sino-Russian declaration on the world order and the Russian line that it’s NATO expansion east that is to blame for its actions. This carries huge reputational risk for China.
This is Xi’s big personal bet on Putin, with whom he gets along well. This is causing some discontent, if not criticism, within the CPC. (This sounds like a piece of Kremlinology, though.)
When forced to choose between Russia and Ukraine, China choose China. Beijing offers serious support for Moscow, but so far it is all words and not much money. It won’t provide material support to Russia. But it won’t pressure Russia to end the war either. That would mean supporting the US position, and the US has nothing to offer in return. “Why would I beat up my old friend so that you beat me up next?”
While China maintains a strategic friendliness with Russia and shared antipathy for the U.S.-dominated world order, Chinese companies have recently shown extreme caution in maintaining sanctions compliance. For example, Huawei paused Russian operations. On the other hand, CNOOC, CNPC, and Sinopec are in talks with Shell about buying out its Sakhalin JV with Gasprom.
China is encouraged by Indian ambivalence and is trying not to alienate Europe
China sees an opportunity to lead a re-energized Non-Aligned Movement by playing up concerns about food insecurity, traditional anti-colonialism and anti-Americanism, and disdain for the EU’s hypocritical refugee policy.
Longer-term, Sino-Russian relation is… complicated. There is lot of mutual distrust. China sees Russia as a junior partner. It’s ambivalent about the unequal treaties of Aigun and Peking. Their interests in Central Asia are often misaligned. Still, Russia was confident enough in its partnership with China to move lots of its troops west.
South Korea
South Korea swiftly condemned Russia’s actions and imposed sanctions on Russia. But beyond that, official backing for Ukraine has failed to match the enthusiasm of ordinary people’s support. Many citizens have made donations to Ukraine. There have been frequent public protests against Russia. Antagonizing Russia and China would create security risks—both have sway in North Korea. Also, China is by far its largest trading partner. So South Korea has refused to supply Ukraine with weapons.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
From a recent article in The Economist:
Despite having only weak ties to Russia, [they] have assessed more cost than benefit in standing with the West. They do not want to antagonise a crucial partner that has co-operated with OPEC to prop up oil prices. Moreover, they see a chance to send a signal. They want more help from America dealing with problems in their backyard, such as the missiles and drones fired from Yemen and the Iranian-backed militias spreading mayhem from Beirut to Baghdad.
Moreover, in Saudi Arabia’s case, the rift with the US also has a personal dimension. According to WSJ, after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was accused by the US in 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has hit its lowest point in decades, with President Biden saying in 2019 that the kingdom should be treated as a pariah over human-rights issues. The prince faces civil lawsuits over the killing.
There are other frictions in the US-Saudi relations:
The risk for the U.S. is that Riyadh will align more closely with China and Russia, or at least remain neutral on issues of vital interest to Washington, as it has on Ukraine, Saudi officials said.
The U.S.-Saudi partnership was built on the premise that the American military would defend the kingdom from hostile powers to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil to world markets. In turn, successive Saudi kings maintained a steady supply of crude at reasonable prices, with only occasional disruptions. But the economic underpinning of the relationship has changed. The Saudis no longer sell much oil to the U.S. and are instead the biggest supplier to China, reorienting Riyadh’s commercial and political interests.
The White House has stopped asking the Saudis to pump more oil. Instead, it asks only that Saudi Arabia not do anything that would hurt the West’s efforts in Ukraine, a senior U.S. official said.
Rapprochement won’t be easy. Mr. Biden faces staunch opposition to improving ties with the Saudis from Democratic and Republican lawmakers, especially since Prince Mohammed has shown little willingness to retreat from a lucrative alliance with Moscow to keep a lid on oil-production levels.
Prince Mohammed’s demand for acknowledgment by Mr. Biden of his claim to inherit the throne has grown more complicated
Saudi Arabia wants more support for its intervention in Yemen’s civil war and to bolster its defenses against cross-border attacks from Iran-allied Houthi fighters. Riyadh also wants help with its civilian nuclear capabilities and more investments in its economy by U.S. companies.
Mr. Biden is unable or unlikely to meet most of these demands, given the lack of support for Saudi Arabia in Congress
India and “Global South”
Here is the digest of The Economist’s analysis in two recent articles, Why so much of the world won’t stand up to Russia and Interests, not values, underpin Asia’s ambivalence about Russia, plus this podcast on India’s dilemma.
In March, President Biden made headlines when he described India as being “somewhat shaky” on the issue of punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
Governments across Asia are performing feats of acrobatics to avoid antagonising America, Russia, China or their own citizens.
India is perhaps the most inconvenient of the serial abstainers. […] But it is far from alone. In Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, even longtime allies and clients of America are rebuffing its entreaties to impose sanctions on Russia or merely to criticise it.
[They are concerned] that sanctions on Russia are driving up food and energy prices. Rising food prices and a history of Western hypocrisy and selfishness aren’t helping.
In recent years, the reluctance of rich countries to invest in mitigating climate change and the slow and uneven distribution of covid-19 vaccines had already reinvigorated the Non-Aligned Movement.
The West’s concern for Ukraine’s sovereignty is seen as self-serving and hypocritical, partly in light of America’s war in Iraq and the NATO-led bombing of Libya in 2011. […] The warm European welcome granted to Ukrainian refugees, compared to that accorded Syrian refugees, prompts eye-rolling.
Few Asians share the European and American perception of the war as a grand battle between democracies and autocracies. For many of them, including most of America’s allies in Asia, responses to Russia’s invasion have been dictated first by cold calculations of interests, with values coming a distant second. Many Asian governments look to America for security even though China is their chief economic partner. Their backyard—the “Indo-Pacific”, as America now likes to call it—is where the tussle between the two powers is playing out. […] For Asia, the war in Ukraine has added an unhelpful extra dimension to what was already a tricky balancing act.
Russia is South-East Asia’s largest supplier of weapons.
That both Vietnam and India are reacting to the Russian invasion with similarly calculated ambivalence shows how countries’ political systems do not necessarily determine their responses to the war. India is a noisy democracy. Vietnam is a secretive Communist dictatorship. Both are on increasingly good terms with America and wary of China, but are also big buyers of Russian arms. For their own security, they see a need to preserve good relationships in Moscow.
Russian propaganda [in Asia] feeds grievances against the West. Russia’s state-run media, such as the Arabic service of the network RT or the Turkish edition of Sputnik, are popular.
Latin American countries supported the first two UN resolutions condemning Russia for the war. But several, including Brazil and Mexico, balked at kicking Russia off the Human Rights Council, and there is little appetite in the region for joining the sanctions regime.
Mexico, despite having condemned the invasion, has a long-held policy of non-intervention and a habit of shrugging off events far beyond its borders.
It is in Africa that Russia has found the most outright sympathy. Almost half of African countries—25 of 54—abstained or stayed away from the first UN vote. The history of colonialism makes some reluctant to throw support behind what is seen as a Western cause. But others are acting out of growing affinity with Russia. That is true of South Africa. […] In southern Africa many countries see Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union, which armed and trained the guerrilla armies that fought colonial powers and segregationist regimes.
In other parts of Africa, support for Russia reflects its success in spreading influence by selling weapons or supplying mercenaries.
The war could be a lucky break for Maduro’s regime in Venezuela. The Economist reports:
Even before Russia’s war in Ukraine, Venezuela had been producing more oil. Over the past year, it doubled its output to around 800,000 barrels a day. Although that is a fraction of the 3m it produced in the 1990s, it is enough to replace the 199,000 barrels a day the United States imported from Russia in 2021. Several American refineries were built to process viscous Venezuelan crude specifically. They struggle with runnier Saudi stuff or domestically produced shale oil.
At the moment, however, the United States bans the import of Venezuelan oil […]
If Mr Biden is considering a detente with Venezuela, it would not just be for economic reasons. He may hope to exploit the war in Ukraine to drive a wedge between Venezuela and Russia, one of its closest allies.
Also, Venezuela was stashing its money in Russian banks. Western sanctions make it difficult for Maduro and his lieutenants to get their money out of Russia.
Mr Maduro may also be concerned that, now Russia is a pariah, too, it will become a competitor in selling cut-price oil. Since 2020 China has been the main buyer of Venezuelan crude. But importing oil from halfway around the world makes little sense if Russian oil is going begging on China’s doorstep.
Back to Ukraine
All that said, the most important world-changing action is happening in Ukraine, behind the fog of war.
Putin winning and imposing his will on Ukraine would be a catastrophe for Ukrainians and (yes!) Russians. It would also be a disaster for post-WWII world order with its respect for countries’ borders, human rights, and rule-based globalized economy.
Putin losing and lashing out with a tactical nuclear strike would be a catastrophe beyond my comprehension.
As time goes on and Ukraine’s resistance stiffens, its chances of fighting off the aggressor and triggering some change in Russia grow stronger. Ukraine deserves all the respect and help we can give it.